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The aim of this work is to examine a few aspects of Jacques Derrida’s reading of the philos-
ophy of Heidegger and Levinas. Specifically, we intend to show that the criticism Derrida 
directs towards certain themes in Levinas’s thought at the same time contains a revaluation 
of Heidegger’s ontology as it was developed during the 1920s, before the so-called Kehre. 
What this triple hermeneutic comparison puts into play is the relationship between ethics 
and ontology. In critiquing the relationship between these two concepts in Levinas, Derrida 
seems to move closer to the way they are described and developed in both Being and Time 
and in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Finally, we will try to show how this reevalua-
tion of ontology by Derrida determines his approach to the philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy, 
whose ethics, differently from Levinas’s, is an ethics of ontology. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this work, we will try to show that the three main moments in Derrida’s 
interpretation of Levinas reveal a continuity that often remains undetected by 
scholars. This continuity involves the relationship between ethics and ontolo-
gy: contrary to any appearances gleaned from a superficial reading, in reality, 
between 1964 and 1997 Derrida did not change his position on the way the two 
spheres should relate, and did not for this reason reevaluate Levinas while in-
stead discrediting Heidegger.  
The first issue worth highlighting when confronting these three philoso-
phers is the widespread understanding that Derrida, especially when dealing 
with ethics, should be considered much closer to Levinas than to Heidegger. 
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In an important article about postmodern ethics1, Scott Lash grouped to-
gether Levinas, Derrida and Bauman. According to Lash, these three authors 
share a focus on unconditional responsibility in face of the demand of the oth-
er as the element that characterizes their ethics as an ethics of respect and dif-
ference. In Lash’s view, this ethics remains too abstract, as it lacks the dimen-
sion of “groundedness”, that is, the reference to concrete forms of life. Post-
modern ethics would be an ethics of respect, but not an ethics of recognition. 
These concrete forms of life are detected by Lash not only in philosophers of 
communitarianism, but also in “Heidegger’s grounding of the singular ‘I’ into 
a world, an ethical life, a set of practices”2. Here the reference is to the section 
of Being and Time where Heidegger refers to the sharing of signifiers and 
practices that are common on the part of a historically situated community. 
Indeed, in paragraphs 73-74, Heidegger speaks of Dasein absorbed in pre-
reflexive practices whether with equipment (Zeuge) or with other finite human 
beings. Similarly, the Heideggerian concepts of “preoccupation” (besorgen) for 
things, and “solicitude” (Fürsorgen) for other human beings, reveal a situated 
and positioned structure of this community comprised of equipment and 
Dasein that are valued and cared for.  
This means that the relationship with the other is not a relationship based 
on an absolute exteriority where someone comes as an event, breaking the 
horizon of knowledge of the ego. Levinas, Derrida and Bauman, according to 
Lash, all criticize this primacy of knowledge over ethics3. By stressing the ab-
sence of a ground, and by emphasizing the lack of concreteness of forms of life 
in postmodern ethics, Lash is implicitly rejecting the separation between ethics 
and ontology that Levinas advocates. Ontology, indeed, is the sphere of Being 
and beings, of concrete and empirical relationships that are excluded by the 
paradigm of the unconditional responsibility for the Other. 
Therefore, Lash draws a link between Levinas and Derrida in their recipro-
cal rejection of Heideggerian Dasein as situated in a matrix of practices and 
signifiers that it shares with other Dasein. 
Many other scholars, especially in the 80’s and early 90’s, approached 
Levinas and Derrida, stressing the affinity of their ethical theories, especially 
with regard to the issue of hospitality conceived as unconditional duty towards 
the other4. After all, it’s Derrida himself who, in a discussion with André Ja-
 
1 Scott Lash, Postmodern Ethics. The missing Ground, in “Theory, Culture & Society”, 
1996, 13 (2): 91-104. 
2 Ibid., p. 94 
3 Ibid., p. 95. 
4 Among others : R. Bernasconi, The trace of Levinas in Derrida, in Derrida and Différance, 
ed. D. Wood and R. Bernasconi, Parousia Press, Coventry 1985, pp. 17-44; ID., Deconstruction 




cob, declared a substantial agreement with many of Levinas’ positions, includ-
ing those more related to the ethical sphere5. 
In some cases, as we saw in Lash’s article, the approach of Derrida and 
Levinas contained the simultaneous separation between Derrida and 
Heidegger, a point echoed by Simon Critchley, who, in The Ethics of Decon-
struction6stressed what he defined as “an emerging homology” between 
Levinas and Derrida7. According to Critchley, the work of Derrida contains a 
permanent tension towards ethics as something essential for deconstruction. 
The ethics in question is specifically that of Levinas, which Derrida would re-
trace in particular when referring to the ethical duty as an unconditional im-
perative, something that, in Critchley’s view, emerges  especiallyin the pages of 
Afterword8.Moreover, in Critchley’s reading, this homology strengthens itself 
as Derrida pinpoints in Levinas’s ethics the overcoming of Heidegger’s reser-
vation about the separation of ethics and ontology in the history of western 
metaphysics. Indeed, in the Letter on Humanism9, Heidegger contested the 
tripartition of logic, physics and ethics as separate regions of enquiry carried 
out by western philosophy. In his opinion, this separation conceals the original 
union between ethics and ontology, which he detected in Heraclitus’s 119th 
fragment “ethos anthropoi daimon”.  Heidegger’s translation of this fragment 
is “The (familiar) abode is for man the open region for the presencing of god 
(the unfamiliar one)”. Thus, what Heidegger defines as the “originary ethics”, 
that is, the proximity of human thought to Being and its manifestation, goes 
past any separation between ethics and ontology, which, following this line of 
reasoning, is still trapped in a thought of the single beings. This thought is still 
metaphysical as it is incapable of reaching Being itself. Critchley noted that 
Derrida, though sharing Heidegger’s concerns about the metaphysical impli-
cations of setting the priority of ethics over other spheres (such as ontology), 
believes that the sense Levinas attributes to the word ethics implies an over-
 
and the Possibility of Ethics, in Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. J. Sallis, University of Chi-
cago Press, Chicago and London 1987, pp. 122-139; J. Llewelyn, Levinas, Derrida and Others 
vis-à-vis, in Beyond Metaphysics, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1985, pp. 185-206. 
5 The conversation is transcribed in the volume Altérités, Osiris, Paris 1986.  
6 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, Blackwell Publishers, 1992. We will quote 
from the second edition, published by Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1999. 
7 Critchley further develops these considerations in Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity. Essays on 
Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought, Verso, London 1999. 
8 J. Derrida, Afterword. Toward an Ethics of Discussion, in Limited Inc., tr. S. Weber, 
Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1988. 
9 M. Heidegger, Brief über den “Humanismus”, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1947. 
Trans. William McNeil: Letter on Humanism, in Pathmarks, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1998, pp. 239-277. 
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coming of these same concerns. Indeed, in the aforementioned Altérités, Der-
rida claims that when Levinas speaks of ethics, he does so in a very different 
way to traditional western philosophy10. According to Critchley, this diver-
gence emerges especially in Otherwise than Being, where Levinas “proposes 
the thought of the Good beyond Being as a third option that exceeds the onto-
logical difference between Being and beings”11. 
It is thus interesting to note how the homology between Levinas and Derri-
da reflected in these cases, as well as in many others, is often outlined through 
a simultaneous opposition between Derrida and Heidegger with regard to the 
ethics-ontology relationship. Derrida, according to predominant interpreta-
tions of his thought, would follow Levinas’s lesson on ethics, thus separating it 
from ontology and refusing Heidegger’s option of an “originary ethics” in 
connection to ontology. 
An opinion of this sort may form in some critics because the polemical ap-
paratus that Derrida creates when he confronts Heidegger is certainly formi-
dable and, therefore, rightly deserving of center stage. However, it is also im-
portant to note that this view does not exhaust the gamut of assessments and 
opinions that Derrida has to offer on Heidegger’s philosophy.  
It is certainly true that Derrida, although he was responding to a series of 
ideas provided by Heidegger, did try to reconvert and reformulate the most 
problematic aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy as part of what can be defined, 
to all intents and purposes, as a deconstruction. In spite of this, or perhaps 
precisely thanks to this double maneuver of recovery and reversal, Derrida’s 
deconstruction does not imply a total devaluation of Heidegger’s philosophy. 
Rather, he preserves and values some of its elements, especially the already 
mentioned relationship between ethics and ontology. 
However, the complexity of the relationship between Derrida and 
Heidegger is such that in many cases these aspects are not made directly ex-
plicit; instead, they become clear in a partially indirect way through the simul-
taneous deconstruction of other philosophies. The deconstruction thus be-
comes at the same time an operation of “reconstruction”, since by emphasiz-
ing the aporias and metaphysical compromises of one author, through a com-
parative process, he paradoxically succeeds in emphasizing or at least high-
lighting (in a positive sense) the most important aspects of another, previously 
(but also subsequently) deconstructed author.  
This process is disclosed, indeed, in a particularly significant way through 
the criticism that Derrida directs against Levinas in some of his texts. Out of 
 
10Altérités, p. 71. 
11 S. Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, pp. 16-17. 




this criticism, there emerges a simultaneous reevaluation of Heidegger’s think-
ing, which in the end, as we will try to show, positions Derrida closer to the 
ethics of ontology that Jean-Luc Nancy proposed. Nancy, indeed, sets off pre-
cisely from Heideggerian ethics conceived as “originary ethics”, though chang-
ing the sense of this expression in a way that matches Derrida’s point of view.  
2. LEVINAS’S CRITICISM OF HEIDEGGER 
Before going through Derrida’s reading of Levinas, it is opportune to recall 
the main points through which Levinas builds his criticism of hedeggerian phi-
losophy. As we said, Levinas is the philosopher who, more than anyone else, 
theorized the dominance of the ethical over the ontological, and consequently, 
a clear separation between ethics and ontology. This separation feeds off the 
criticism of Heidegger’s ontology, considered similar to the entire course of 
Western thought on being as a thought of the One, of the Same, and especially 
on the primacy of theory which no ontology has ever managed to overturn.  
If, with Husserl, phenomenology remained a slave to the paradigms we have 
just described, despite some seductive appearances, Heidegger’s ontology is in 
reality far from denying them. Which portions of Heidegger’s ontology lead to 
the thought of the Same, in Levinas’s view?  
First of all, there is the distinction between Being and existents, between 
Sein and Seiendes, which also asserts the primacy of the former over the latter. 
This primacy is that of comprehension, to the extent that the distinction sub-
ordinates the relation with individual existents to the relation with the Being 
of these existents:  
Being and Time has argued but one sole thesis: Being is inseparable 
from the comprehension of Being (which unfolds as time); Being is al-
ready an appeal to subjectivity. [ …] To affirm the priority of Being over 
existents is to already decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordi-
nate the relation with someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to 
a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the ap-
prehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), sub-
ordinates justice to freedom.12 
 
12 Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini, Nijhoff, The Hague 1971.Trans. Alphonso Lingis: 
Totality and Infinity, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1991, p. 45.  
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The relation with Being in general is therefore a relation with a neutral 
term, comparable to the concept thought which hinders the relation to the 
Other as infinitely other.13 
In Levinas’s eyes, Heidegger remains trapped in this schema: 
In Heidegger coexistence is, to be sure, taken as a relationship with the Other 
irreducible to objective cognition; but in the final analysis it also rests on the re-
lationship with being in general, on comprehension, on ontology. [ …] Moreover, 
for Heidegger intersubjectivity is a coexistence, a we prior to the I and the other, 
a neutral intersubjectivity. The face-to-face both announces a society, and per-
mits the maintaining of a separated I.14 
This remark on intersubjectivity leads us to one of the salient points of the 
question. Here, Levinas is telling us that the relation to Being in Heidegger is a 
relation of comprehension with the Neuter; but he is also telling us that such a 
relationship hides another one – the relationship between Dasein, already ori-
ented toward a kind of indistinct totality, since Heidegger does not conceive 
subjectivity as a finite, closed totality that enters into relationship with the in-
finitely other. What we have here, of course, are the Levinasian themes of the 
Il y a(the “there is”), understood as neutrality and indistinctiveness of Being, 
and hypostasis as the initial moment of separation in which a proper I affirms 
itself, essential to the subsequent relationship with the infinitely other15. There 
is something here that Levinas seems to exclude, the implications of which we 
will return to over the course of this paper: a possibility of the I to transcend it-
self and differentiate itself that can give rise to an originary Mitsein, under-
stood not as substantiality or fusion, but as a combination of the plural singu-
larities16. The immediacy of the relationship to others (which is excluded by a 
subjectivity that is at first closed and then in relation with the absolutely other) 
gets bogged down in that relationship of comprehension, and of reduction of 
the Other to the Same that we mentioned earlier. For the relation with the in-
finitely other, the I cannot be left out of consideration. 
In refusing to start from this radical separation prior to the encounter with 
the face of the Other, Heidegger falls into a definition of the I (or ego) that im-
 
13 Ibid., p. 44-45. 
14 Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
15 For an overview of these themes : E. Levinas, Le Temps et l’Autre, Fata Morgana, Mont-
pellier 1980. Trans. Richard A. Cohen, Time and the Other, Duquesne University Press, Pitts-
burgh, 1987. 
16 As we said, Lash associated Levinas, Bauman and Derrida as representatives of postmod-
ern ethics. The refusal of an original Mitsein is the reason why Zygmunt Bauman backs Levi-
anas while contesting Heidegger’s social ontology. See: Z. Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, Basil 
Blackwell, Cambridge 1993. 




plies a kind of transcendence of its comprehensive structures with respect to 
the empirical manifestation of alterity – a sort of pre-determination due pre-
cisely to the centrality of comprehension and to the difference between Being 
and existents: 
Comprehension is a way of access. [ …] What is it that makes this access, this 
comprehension possible? According to Heidegger, the fact of relating the per-
ceived object to a sketch of its structure that we trace out in advance: things are 
understood in a movement of the spirit that directs itself, projects itself toward 
them. Here we find what seems to be a familiar idea: we are able to grasp an ob-
ject thanks to an a priori schema. Perception is always based on a pre-perception, 
the vestiges of previous activity, of thought. The comprehension of Being in gen-
eral, the meaning of this word, is the primordial sketch of a horizon in which 
each being in particular, or each of its essences, can appear to us. The compre-
hension of Being in general, a relation that at first sight seems to be the most ab-
stract, but which is at the same time the most familiar, because we have always 
already comprehended it, is the supreme condition for the comprehension of 
particular beings.17 
Levinas seems to set up a sort of transcendental apriorism in Heidegger’s 
structure of the understanding. Clearly, this is an implicit reference to the 
Kantbuch, in which Heidegger dedicates himself to analyzing a priori struc-
tures ofknowledge in Kant, relating them to the problem of knowledge of Be-
ing in general, independently of individual entities.  
Is Levinas’s criticism directed toward the “early” Heidegger, then? There is 
no doubt that Being and Time is his main, although not exclusive, target. 
However, it hardly seems legitimate to refer to Heidegger’s existential analytic 
and ontology of the 1920s in general by somehow establishing the pure aprior-
ism of knowledge. All of Heidegger’s efforts during this phase of his philoso-
phy are directed toward providing the transcendental structures with an im-
mediate factual reference, in order to ensure that an originary alterity lurks in 
phenomena that are pre-empirical but that carry within them the very injunc-
tion to facticity and thus to finitude.  
Referring to Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, as we know, in this text 
Heidegger seeks to highlight the decisive character of temporality in the very 
constitution of the categories and, hence, the relation between temporality and 
logic. What he attempts to do, in the broadest sense, by demonstrating the im-
portance of the intuition of time in Kant, is to clarify the relationship between 
 
17 E. Levinas, En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger , J. Vrin, Paris 1949. 
Trans. Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith: Discovering Existence with Husserl, North-
western University Press, Evanston, IL, 1998. This quote is translated from the Italian edition: 
Scoprire l’esistenza con Husserl e Heidegger, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milan 1998, pp. 88-89.  
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metaphysics and finitude. At stake in the first term is the transcendental struc-
ture of subjectivity, or in Heideggerian terms, the knowledge of Being in gen-
eral as opposed to that of entities.  
The privilege granted to the pure intuition of time (through the medium of 
transcendental imagination and schematism) even within the a priori 
knowledge provided by the categories and by the I think has the function, in 
Heidegger’s view, of highlighting the finitude of theoretical knowledge even in 
its transcendental structures: hence, the finite nature of the knowledge of Be-
ing in general.  
This finitude of the transcendental structures, this factual reference to the 
pre-empirical, is found in the Kantbuch, in paragraph 30, where Heidegger al-
so analyzes the problem of ethics in Kant. At this point, what Heidegger iden-
tifies in duty is an unbreakable bond with finitude, based on the simultaneous 
connection between duty and lack:  
A creature that is fundamentally interested in a duty knows itself in a not-yet-
having-fulfilled, so that what indeed it should do becomes questionable to it. 
This not-yet of a fulfilling, which is itself still undetermined, gives us a clue that 
a creature whose innermost interest is with a duty is fundamentally finite.18 
In this way, therefore, the ethical demand requires an immediate transition 
to the factual; or rather, the very fact of “sensing” or perceiving the ethical 
demand is a sign of the empiricity inherent in the demand itself, even where it 
is perceived in consciousness prior to a factual encounter with the other. 
Without elaborating further on this point, we note, however, that the 
finitude of the transcendental structures as they are thus defined implies a fac-
tual, ontological reference, also belonging to the ethical sphere. And at the 
same time, this ontological reference is correlative to an originary alterity of 
the I, which even in the solitude of the moral conscience can sense the pres-
ence of the other as a feeling of lack and therefore as an injunction to the em-
pirical. 
This constitutive alterity of Dasein, or Dasein’s alienation from itself, had 
already appeared in sections 55 to 57 of Being and Time, where Heidegger an-
alyzed the phenomenon of conscience as the call:  
Indeed the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither 
planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever 
done so. ʽItʼ calls, against our expectations and even against our will. On 
 
18 M. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Verlag Fred. Cohen, Bonn 1929. 
Trans. Richard Taft: Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Indiana University Press, Bloom-
ington, Indiana, 1990, p. 151. 




the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else 
who is with me in the world. The call comes from me and yet from be-
yond me and over me. [...] The fact that the call is not something which is 
explicitly performed by me, but that rather ʽitʼ does the calling, does not 
justify seeking the caller in some entity with a character other than that of 
Dasein.19 
In any case, as has been remarked, it is precisely this presence of the other 
in the I as an originary phenomenon what Levinas cannot accept. For him, 
ethics understood as a metaphysics of the encounter with the Other stands in 
the way of positively referring to an ontology of the singular plural, because it 
requires an interior, separate egoicity from the outset. 
3. DERRIDA’S INTERPRETATION OF LEVINAS IN VIOLENCE AND 
METAPHYSICS 
Derrida’s confrontation with Levinas can be divided into three principal 
moments, although a series of implicit and explicit suggestions and allusions 
can be found in many of his texts. These three instances, in chronological or-
der, are Violence and metaphysics: an essay on the thought of Emmanuel 
Levinas, published in 1964;20At This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am, 
published in 1980;21 and finally, the two pieces collected in the book Adieu to 
Emmanuel Levinas, appearing in 1997.22 
On first examination of the three writings, Derrida’s position toward 
Levinas seems to undergo a major shift. While the 1964 essay is the most criti-
cal, the later texts are not only more charitable, they could even be seen as set-
ting up a philosophical heritage that passes from Levinas to Derrida, some-
 
19 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1927. Trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson: Being and Time, Harper & Row, New York 1962, pp. 320-321. 
20 J. Derrida, Violence et métaphysique. Essai sur la pensée d’Emmanuel Levinas, inRevue 
de métaphysique et de morale, 3 and 4, 1964, subsequently reproduced in Jacques Derrida, 
L’écriture et la différence, Seuil, Paris 1967. Trans. Alan Bass: Violence and metaphysics: an es-
say on the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, in Writing and Difference, Routledge, London, 1978, 
pp. 97-192. 
21 J. Derrida, En ce moment même dans cet ouvrage me voici, in Various Authors, Textes 
pour Emmanuel Levinas , Jean-Michel Place Editeur, Paris 1980, later appearing in Jacques 
Derrida, Psyche. Inventions de l’autre, Galilee, Paris 1987. Trans. Peggy Kamuf: At This Very 
Moment in this Work Here I Am, in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume 1, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, Stanford CA 2007, pp. 143-190. 
22 J. Derrida, Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas, Éditions Galilée, Paris 1997.Trans. Pascale-Anne 
Brault and Michael Naas: Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA 
1999.  
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thing that would seem quite unthinkable in Violence and Metaphysics. How-
ever, as we will attempt to show, this is not a real change in Derrida’s perspec-
tive toward Levinas, since the instances that mark out his progressive apprecia-
tion of Levinas’s work from 1980 onwards are in the final analysis already pre-
sent in his 1964 critique. This fact is especially interesting given that it is 
Heidegger who occupies a central position both in Derrida’s criticism and in 
his praise of Levinas’s philosophy. The criticism against an ethics devoid of on-
tology, found in the 1964 essay, is pursued by Derrida with constant reference 
to Heidegger. In the same way, later instances of Derrida’s Levinasian herme-
neutics seem to add up to an “overcoming of Levinas vis-à-vis Heidegger”23that 
in reality, as we will show, is only apparent. In each case the relationship be-
tween ethics and ontology, central to all three essays, is thought out and articu-
lated by Derrida starting from the relationship between Levinas and 
Heidegger.  
Let us begin with Violence and Metaphysics. What we find in this text is a 
critical reformulation of most of the themes through which Levinas’s opposi-
tion to Heidegger’s ontology was expressed, as we saw. The absence of alterity 
in the ego and the need for the initial separation are clearly pegged by Derrida 
as one of the points in Levinas’s philosophy that urgently require critiquing. In 
describing Levinas’s position, Derrida notes that for Levinas  
The ego is the same. The alterity or negativity interior to the ego, the in-
terior difference, is but an appearance [...] the ego cannot engender alteri-
ty within itself without encountering the Other24. 
 This goes straight to the point: for Levinas neither self-transcendence nor 
the originary alterity of the self are conceivable – only the encounter with the 
absolutely other starting from a closed subjectivity.  
What is Derrida’s response to this position? A polemical one, indubitably. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, his criticism of Levinas takes its cue from a defense, on 
the theme of alterity, of the work of Husserl, in particular his famous fifth Car-
tesian meditation.25 As we know, Levinas strongly criticizes the concept of ana-
logical appresentation and the idea of the other as alter ego, which he sees as 
attempts to reduce it to the same. Thus, Husserl’s fifth Cartesian meditation 
 
23 Silvano Petrosino, introduction to the Italian edition of Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas: 
Addio a Emmanuel Lévinas, Jaca Book, Milan 1998, p. 18. 
24 J. Derrida, Violence and Metaphysics, pp. 116-117. 
25 Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1950. Trans. Dorion Cairns: Cartesian Meditations. 
An Introduction to Phenomenology, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Nether-
lands, 1999. 




does nothing but demonstrate the fundamental incompatibility of phenome-
nology with a genuine thought on alterity. In this context, for Levinas, con-
cepts such as horizon and, above all, intentionality, are totally inappropriate, 
because they can substantially be traced back to the voluntarism of a subject 
who is master of his actions and seeks to make the non-I proper to him.  
Derrida’s defense against Husserl on this theme is quite clear, as he consid-
ers the reference to the analogical appresentation, not a reduction of the other 
to the same, but rather something that recognizes the separation of the other 
from the I, avoiding any kind of assimilation of the former by the latter26.  
Starting from Husserl, then, it sets out the necessity for a thought on alterity 
that is different from that of Levinas on the absolutely other – a thought in 
which one starts from an Other who is recognized as such by the I. This does 
not mean assimilation, since the other is simply recognized as other; but ana-
logical appresentation at the same time prevents it from being made into a 
metaphysical or infinite entity, since the I makes a formal analogy from itself 
to the other that allows it to be identified as a finite being. 
And yet, although Derrida starts from Husserl, there is one more step that 
he believes he has to take in order to repudiate Levinas’s idea of an absolutely 
other. This step regards the originary alterity of the ego – clearly not a Husser-
lian theme, but unavoidable nonetheless for arriving at an ontology that is at 
the same time a thought of alterity (and therefore an ethics):  
[This exercise] would mean that the expression ‘infinitely other’ or ‘abso-
lutely other’ cannot be stated and thought simultaneously; that the other 
cannot be absolutely exterior to the same without ceasing to be other; and 
that, consequently, the same is not a totality closed in upon itself, an iden-
tity playing with itself, having only the appearance of alterity, in what 
Levinas calls economy, work, and history. How could there be a ‘play of 
the Same’ if alterity itself was not already in the Same, with a meaning of 
inclusion doubtless betrayed by the word in?.27 
Having reasserted this need to think the alterity of the I, what remains to be 
seen is how Heidegger could fall under this paradigm, as well as the ineffec-
tiveness, as Derrida sees them, of the criticisms that Levinas directs toward the 
German philosopher. 
As we said, Levinas explains the difference between Being and existents by 
a relationship of comprehension that traces out the contours of a sort of a pri-
ori structure of knowledge. Thanks to this, the encounter with the other exist-
 
26 J. Derrida, Violence and Metaphysics, pp. 154-155. 
27 Ibid., p. 158. 
484 LUCA SERAFINI 
 
ent is preceded by the comprehension of Being as a third, neutral term. Derri-
da firmly rejects this kind of interpretation, which he views as being out of line 
with the letter and spirit of Heidegger’s text:  
Being, since it is nothing outside the existent, a theme which Levinas 
had commented upon so well previously, could in no way precede the ex-
istent, whether in time, or in dignity, etc. Nothing is more clear, as con-
cerns this, in Heidegger’s thought. Henceforth, one cannot legitimately 
speak of the ‘subordination’ of the existent to Being, or, for example, of 
the ethical relation to the ontological relation. To precomprehend or ex-
plicate the implicit relation of Being to the existent is not to submit the 
existent (for example, someone) to Being in a violent fashion. Being is but 
the Being-of this existent, and does not exist outside it as a foreign power, 
or as a hostile or neutral impersonal element.28 
Moreover, it is the thought of being, a certain thought of being, that can 
open the ethical relation. This thought of Being is the thought of “letting-be,” 
which allows the Being of the Other to manifest without the preliminary vio-
lence on the part of the thought of an I. The difference between Being and ex-
istent thus concerns the latter’s possibility of expression:  
‘To let be’ is an expression of Heidegger’s which does not mean, as Levinas 
seems to think, to let be as an ‘object of comprehension first,’ and, in the case of 
the Other, as ‘interlocutor afterward.’ […] If it belongs to the essence of the Other 
first and foremost to be an ‘interlocutor’ and to be interpellated, then the ‘let-
ting-be’ will let the Other be what it is, will respect it as interpellated-
interlocutor. The ‘letting-be’ does not only, or by privilege, concern impersonal 
things. To let the other be in its existence and essence as other means that what 
gains access to thought, or (and) what thought gains access to, is that which is es-
sence and that which is existence; and that which is the Being which they both 
presuppose. Without this, no letting-be would be possible, and first of all, the let-
ting be of respect and of the ethical commandment addressing itself to freedom. 
Violence would reign to such a degree that it would no longer even be able to 
appear and be named.29 
Therefore, if Levinas wanted to develop a true ethics that is consistent with 
his fundamental objectives, in Derrida’s view, he has no choice but to resort to 
this thought of Being as a “letting-be” of the Other – this ontology that is con-
sistent with Derrida’s entire path, starting from Voice and Phenomenon30, and 
that also implies the originary presence of alterity in the I.  
 
28 Ibid., p. 170. 
29 Ibid., p. 172. 
30 J. Derrida, La voix et le phénomène. Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénomé-
nologie de Husserl, P.U.F., Paris 1967. Trans. Leonard Lawlor: Voice and Phenomenon. Intro-




In this context, comprehension in Heidegger does not refer to anything 
transcendental in the sense of the a priori, to anything purely pre-empirical. 
Rather, it concerns this relationship that lets the Other be, and establishes 
thought itself as that which welcomes difference. 
3. DERRIDA’S INTERPRETATION OF LEVINAS IN ADIEU TO 
EMMANUEL LEVINAS  
How do things stand in the next two moments of Derrida’s interpretation of 
Levinas, however? In both there can be noted elements of continuity and dis-
continuity that complicate the question of the relationship between ethics and 
ontology, as they complicate the associated question regarding Derrida’s 
judgment of Heidegger through his critique of Levinas. The reason we are go-
ing to examine the 1997 essays is because, perhaps because of a continuity in 
the theoretical path that is reflected chronologically, Derrida’s interpretation of 
Levinas is particularly laudatory. Does this mean that the elements of discon-
tinuity from the 1964 Violence and Metaphysics prevail, and that Derrida has 
changed his own theme of the relationship between ontology and ethics, grant-
ing exclusivity to the latter that discredits Heidegger’s ontology of the 1920s? 
The main theme of the second piece from 1997, A Word of Welcome, is al-
ready expressed by the title. To all intents and purposes, this is an essay on 
welcoming – on hospitality. The emphasis Derrida gives to these themes dur-
ing the last phase of his work, dating from the 1990s, shows that Levinas’s leg-
acy was gradually gaining force in his philosophy. This at least partially also 
clarifies the apparent shift from the question of the relationship between ethics 
and ontology that we are about to analyze. 
In the essay in question, Derrida focuses especially on Totality and Infinity, 
defined as a genuine “treatise on hospitality”.31Here Levinas unites the phe-
nomenon of hospitality with a particular characterization of consciousness as 
intentionality – not the anticipation of a subjectively-oriented objective con-
tent, but rather, openness to the Other: “It [intentionality,  
consciousness of . . . ] is attention to speech or welcome of the face, hospitality 
and not thematization”.32 In this sense, for Levinas as interpreted by Derrida, 
intentionality and reason itself take form as receptivity, sensitivity, immediate 
opening to the face, to the infinity of the Other. Reason, understood in this 
 
duction to the problem of the Sign in Husserl’s Phenomenology, Northwestern University 
Press, Evanston 2011. 
31 J. Derrida, A Word of Welcome, p. 21. 
32 E. Levinas, Totality and infinity, p. 308. 
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way, is reason as the law of hospitality. The unconditionality of the relationship 
with the Other is thus also expressed, in Totality and Infinity, by reversing the 
way that, traditionally, both reason and intentionality are understood, namely, 
in reference to a subject who is master of himself and the center of his acts.  
By integrating his reading of Totality and Infinity with that of Otherwise 
than Being, Derrida then reaches the second focal point of his interpretation: 
the dissymmetry in the ethical relationship of the face-to-face determined by 
the simultaneity of the third in this relationship. 
As we know, in Levinas, the third party is the eruption of justice as a politi-
cal issue, of society understood as what is irreducible to the ethical relation of 
the subject with the face of the infinitely other.33 In this sense, thirdness or ille-
ity carry the signs of what, by its very nature, is linked to calculation, to com-
mensurability, to the drafting and definition of a series of conditions in imme-
diate and direct contrast with the purely unconditional character of the ethical 
relationship. To characterize the third party as contemporary or co-originating 
with the Other thus means to erode the purity of the ethical relationship.34 
This eruption of the third is defined in terms of a “perjury.” Furthermore, 
this perjury co-originates with the ethical relationship; it does not intervene at 
a later time as a protective measure from the risk of violence; rather, political 
justice is joined with the face-to-face precisely through their commonality of 
origin. Perjury, by eroding the face-to-face, can only take shape as an “other 
than ethics in ethics”, which Derrida, perhaps not coincidentally, comes to de-
fine as ontology: 
[ ... ] if the face to face with the unique engages the infinite ethics of my respon-
sibility for the other in a sort of oath before the letter, an unconditional respect 
or fidelity, then the ineluctable emergence of the third, and, with it, of justice, 
would signal an initial perjury [parjure]. Silent, passive, painful, but inevitable, 
such perjury is not accidental and secondary, but is as originary as the experi-
ence of the face. Justice would begin with this perjury. […] Like the third who 
does not wait, the proceedings hat open both ethics and justice are in the process 
of committing quasi-transcendental or originary, indeed, pre-originary, perjury. 
 
33 Cfr.:E. Levinas, Le moi et la totalité (1954), in Entre nous. Essai sur le penser-à-l’autre, Edi-
tions Grasset & Fasquelle, Paris, 1991. Trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav: The I 
and the Totality, in Entre nous: on thinking-of-the-other, Columbia University Press, New York 
2000, pp. 13-38; and La trace de l’autre, in En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et 
Heidegger, Paris 1967. Trans. Alphonso Lingis:The Trace of the Other, in Deconstruction in 
Context, Mark Taylor (ed.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986, pp. 345-359; and Au-
trement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1974. Trans. 
Alphonso Lingis: Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dor-
drecht and Boston, 1978, pp.153-162. 
34 J. Derrida, A Word of Welcome, pp. 32-33. 




One might even call it ontological, once ethics is joined to everything that ex-
ceeds and betrays it (ontology, precisely, synchrony, totality, the State, the politi-
cal, etc.).35 
Silvano Petrosino notes in the introduction to the Italian edition that “the 
originary mediation of the third implies (here, more than thirty years later, 
“Violence and Metaphysics” is confirmed) the originary character of a certain 
impurity and the emergence of an essential contamination[…] Derrida’s defini-
tion, this Derridean definition of justice, is now understandable. Since it is 
based on the figure of the third as internal to the uniqueness of the face, it 
forcefully reintroduces the theme of ‘essential contamination’ that was already 
clearly emphasized in the 1964 and 1980 essays”.36 
Thus, a continuity in Derrida’s three essays on Levinas is being emphasized 
here – a continuity that, among other things, is based precisely on this folding 
of the ethical relationship, a folding that Derrida more or less explicitly relates 
to ontology – something, moreover, that follows as a consequence of the path 
he embarked on, when, earlier in his Husserlian hermeneutics, he stressed the 
originary alterity of the I. This originary alterity, as we have seen, cannot be 
completely contained by the ethical dimension; rather, its pre-empirical char-
acter is precisely what relates it to ontology. 
Following this line of reasoning, it could be argued that the discussion on 
the co-originarity of the Other and the third in no way relates the ethical rela-
tionship to a pre-factual sphere.  
However, on returning to the main question addressed by the 1997 essay, 
namely, that of hospitality, it is easy to see how Derrida’s thematization goes 
explicitly in the direction of a pre-ethicity no longer and not only based on the 
a posteriori relationship between two subjects; rather, it leads to the founding 
of an archi-original ethics insofar as it precedes itself in its pre-empiricity. In 
this case, ethical immediacy is not only interrupted by the co-originarity of the 
third, it is moreover founded by outlining the contours of a pre-ethicity of eth-
ics itself. 
Hospitality, in Derrida’s Levinas, takes form as a dimension that binds to-
gether the theoretical, the moral, and the political. The term is first related to 
the sphere of consciousness, of the intimacy of the I, and in Totality and Infin-
ity Levinas characterizes it in relation to the feminine: “And the other whose 
presence is discreetly an absence, with which is accomplished the primary 
hospitable welcome which describes the field of intimacy, is the Woman. The 
 
35 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
36 S. Petrosino, introduction to the Italian edition of Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas: Addio a 
Emmanuel Lévinas, pp. 27-28. 
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woman is the condition for recollection, the interiority of the Home, and in-
habitation”.37 What this means is that being-at-one’s-home is already welcom-
ing in itself, since the woman – the feminine – represents both the interiority 
of one’s own dwelling as well as the unconditional opening that hospitality 
presupposes. Thus it is there that the I has a dwelling, its own consciousness as 
its dwelling place, which is open to an exteriority – the exteriority of a welcom-
ing without conditions. This position is certainly different from the one that 
saw the a posteriori encounter between the I separated from the ontological 
indifference of the il y a and the Other.  
Furthermore, this a priori unconditionality of the welcoming, in its differ-
ence with the mastering of the face of the Other that takes place through the 
encounter, is precisely what, in Derrida’s opinion, traces out the contours of an 
ethical structure that precedes ethics itself – an archi-originarity that inscribes 
in the I the principle (albeit always a moral one because it is linked to the ethi-
cal responsibility toward the other) of its exteriorization38. 
The precedence of ethics to itself – pre-ethics or archi-originary ethics – is 
thus best disclosed by the figure of the Woman and by the category of hospital-
ity. If the host is also in some way already a guest, as Levinas’s text repeatedly 
stresses; if the host, in the very act of welcoming the Other, is a guest wel-
comed by the Other – a subject in whom the activity of hosting and the passiv-
ity of being hosted are rooted in the interchangeability of positions that the act 
of hospitality gives rise to – then the same hosting individual discovers that he 
is a stranger to himself. In other words, he discovers the presence and sign of 
his alteration within himself39. 
It is therefore clear that the subject’s non-belonging to himself in his own 
dwelling, which is to say, in his own consciousness and hospitality, acquires a 
thoroughly transcendental value, where this term refers not to the infinite 
transcendence of the other experienced in the encounter, but the transcend-
ence of the individual I as originary alterity inscribed in its a priori structures 
preceding the experience itself. Indeed, Derrida himself points out that the 
feminine as unconditional hospitality is a theoretical framework that has noth-
ing in common with the ethics of the a posteriori relationship. In doing this, 
however, he takes a further step that separates his conclusions on the theme of 
the feminine from those outlined on the question of the co-originarity between 
the Other and the third, between ethics and political justice, differentiating 
this a priori pre-ethical from any kind of ontology:  
 
37 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 155. 
38 J. Derrida, A Word of Welcome, p. 38-39. 
39 Ibid., p 41. 




For this text [a previous passage from Levinas] defines the welcome par excel-
lence, the welcome or welcoming of absolute, absolutely originary, or even pre-
originary hospitality, nothing less than the pre-ethical origin of ethics, on the ba-
sis of femininity. That gesture reaches a depth of essential or meta-empirical rad-
icality that takes sexual difference into account in an ethics emancipated from 
ontology. It confers the opening of the welcome upon ‘the feminine being’ and 
not upon the fact of empirical women.40 
The ethics of welcoming is therefore let loose from empirical fact. Following 
this reasoning, it is clear that this is an ethics that, in principle, is entirely non-
ontological, separated from Being at the time it is inscribed in pre-facticity. If 
the need for hospitality is indeed unconditional, no factual conditioncan af-
fectthe apriorism of this principle. Ontology would then be expelled and 
Levinasian ethics, consistent with its fundamental objectives, would remain 
through and through an ethics that materializes through its opposition to on-
tology. 
However, it is also clear that this type of pre-empiricity describes a dynamic 
quite different from that of the encounter of an I that has parted company 
from the anonymity of the il y a with the absolutely other. While in the second 
case the ethics of the face-to-face is a-ontological because, in the dual relation-
ship between subjectivities that constitute themselves in solitude, it would 
break with ontology as a thought of the Same, in the first case, what we have is 
an a-ontological pre-empiricity that traces out the contours of ethical uncondi-
tionality before entry into Being. This a priori condition, which is to say, the 
unconditionality of ethical responsibility and of hospitality, is also very close to 
the pre-empiricity of the transcendental structures of subjectivity, in both the 
theoretical and moral spheres, that Heidegger tracked down in his Kant. In-
deed, to inscribe alterity in the pre-empiricity of the subject already means 
bending the subject toward its factual alteration; it means enjoining the subject 
to be, to keep open its original difference. Or rather: it is the subject itself that 
“senses” this injunction, and in its pre-empiricity, sensing the presence of the 
Other, is already led to act in Being, even thought he perceives the injunction 
before Being. 
This ethics is, therefore, an ethics of ontology that collocates Derrida at 
least in a middle point between the Levinas’s separation of ethics and ontology 




40 Ibid., p. 44. 
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4. JEAN-LUC NANCY’S ETHICS OF ONTOLOGY 
Nonetheless, it is also true that the sense in which Derrida reconnects ethics 
and ontology is quite different from the Heideggerian attempt to define ethics 
as the dwelling in the proximity of Being in the Letter in Humanism. As we 
saw, in Derrida the ethics of ontology means rather the original diversification 
of the ‘I’ even in its pre-empirical structures, the alterity that inhabits the ‘I’ 
from the very beginning and that “enjoins” to the ‘I’ the fact of being, of exist-
ing. Perhaps the best way to understand this partial recovery of Heidegger’s 
ethics of ontology, which is also a shift from Heidegger’s formulation, is to re-
fer to Jean-Luc Nancy’s interpretation of Heidegger’s “originary ethics”41. 
The work of Heidegger is central to Nancy’s thought, as he tries to retrieve 
early Heideggerian philosophy - dating back to the 1920s - in service of a phi-
losophy of community. This thought is that of which Nancy defines as “being 
singular plural”42, that is, the fact that being is something immediately rela-
tional, as well as immediately relational is subjectivity itself.  This leads us al-
ready to the point we have been developing throughout this essay: for Nancy, 
indeed, subjectivity and being coincide, as long as both are considered in a re-
lational sense. Nancy sets off from Heidegger’s paragraph 26 of Being and 
Time, in which Dasein, as being-in-the world, is considered also being-with 
(Mitsein). According to Nancy, this would demonstrate how Heidegger is the 
philosopher who managed to get closest to a thought of community as some-
thing constituted by plural subjectivities, that is, subjects who perceive their al-
terity within their theoretical constitutions as individuals (even if, in his follow-
ing characterizations of community, starting from the sections of Being and 
Time on temporality and historicity, Heidegger himself completely abandons 
these ideas). From Nancy’s point of view, this would emerge also in 
Heidegger’s reading of Kant in the Kantbuch, where, as we noticed, Heidegger 
highlights the constitutive finitude of theoretical knowledge even in its tran-
scendental structures. In a text entitled L’imperatif catégorique, Nancy applies 
this line of reasoning to the ethical sphere. Starting from the distinction be-
tween hypothetical and categorical imperatives in Kant, Nancy interprets the 
concept of “pure practical reason as a transcendental structure, but whose 
 
41Jean-Luc Nancy deals with the issue in: L’”étique originaire” de Heidegger, published for 
the first time in Dictionnaire d’éthique et philosophie morale, « Heidegger », PUF, Paris 1996, 
andat a later stage in Jean-Luc Nancy, La pensée dérobée, Editions Galilée, Paris 2001. English 
version: Heidegger’s ‘Originary Ethics’, inStudies in Practical Philosophy 1999; 1 (1). 
 
42 J.-L. Nancy, Être singulier pluriel, Galilée, Paris 1996. Trans. Robert D. Richardson and 
Anne E. O’Byrne: Being Singular Plural, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2000. 




transcendence, given its moral connotation, is determined by receptivity to the 
presence of others43. The constitutive presence of alterity in a transcendental 
structure of the subject ensures that the categorical imperative will therefore 
have the character of a pure element, but at the same time be indicative of a 
constitutive openness towards the other. This is the same structure that we saw 
at work in Derrida’s reading of Levinas, and implies a factical, empirical, and 
ontological reference within the individual, something that is bent, in both 
Derrida’s and Nancy’s philosophy, towards the idea of an “alterity” which in-
habits the individual from the beginning.  
But to fully understand the ontological reference of this discourse, we have 
to come back to Nancy’s aforementioned text. In Heidegger’s “Originary eth-
ics”, indeed, Nancy bends the ethics of ontology in a different sense to the lit-
eral meaning of Heidegger’s text. But Nancy’s reading is the one that allows us 
to better understand the way Derrida himself connects ethics and ontology, as 
in both Derrida and Nancy the refusal of Levinas’ radical separation of the two 
spheres implies a retake of Heidegger which goes beyond him.  
As Nancy claims in the text we are analyzing, the “originary ethics” of 
Heidegger should be interpreted not in the sense of a dwelling in the proximi-
ty of Being and a welcoming of its invocations, but rather as a “conduct”:  
Ethos needs to be thought as "abode" (according to Heraclitus’s saying ethos 
anthropoi daimori). The abode is the "there" in that it is open. The abode is thus 
much more a conduct than a residence (or rather, "residing" is above all a con-
duct, the conduct of Being-the-there). The thinking of this conduct is thus the 
‘original ethics’, because it thinks ethos as the conduct of/according to the truth 
of Being. This thinking is thus more fundamental than an ontology: it does not 
think ‘beings in their Being’, but ‘the truth of Being’. It was already in this sense 
that the thinking of Being and Time designated itself as fundamental ontology. 
So it becomes clear not only that the thinking of Being involves an ethics, but, 
much more radically, it involves itself as an ethics. ‘Original ethics’ is the more 
appropriate name for ‘fundamental ontology’. Ethics properly is what is funda-
mental in fundamental ontology44. 
The fundamental ontology is thus thought as the openness of Dasein, that 
is, as conduct that puts Being at stake. So far this discourse does not differ 
from Heidegger’s. Nonetheless, the way the residence transforms itself in a 
conduct happens through the characterization of Dasein as Being-the-there. In 
his texts, Nancy often interprets the there, the Da of Dasein, in a spatial sense, 
as abandonment of its position. From an ethical stance, this implies the open-
ness of Dasein as something which has within itself the principle of its own dif-
 
43 See: J.-L. Nancy, L’impératif catégorique, FLAMMARION, Paris 1983. 
44 J.-L. Nancy, Heidegger’s ‘Originary Ethics’, cit., pp. 28-29. 
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ference, as something which differentiates itself, and thus contains the other in 
itself:  
So ek-sistence is the way of Being of Being as Dasein (Heidegger 1993, 228). 
This way of Being is immediately a conduct- the conduct of Being-open to mak-
ing-sense- a Being-open which is itself opened by (or rather, whose opening con-
sists in) the desire /ability of sense. In that it is thus opened, this conduct is a set-
ting-outside-itself, or ex-position as the very position of the ek-sistent. This Being-
outside-itself, or this "ecstatic essence" (229), does not occur to an already given 
‘self’. It is, on the contrary, through it, that something like a ‘self’ (a subject, and 
a responsible subject) can come about45. 
This auto-differentiation, this being outside itself implied in the concept of 
ek-sistence, as we have noticed, has a direct relationship with space, with the 
abandonment of a position and thus with “action” as something which makes 
Dasein appear in the world and expose itself to the others. But both the auto-
differentiation and the spatial abandonment of position are modalities of “be-
ing”. The ek of the ek-sistence coincides with the Da of Da-sein; both mark the 
concept of being as a way of being outside oneself. This is the reason why 
Nancy can claim that  
Being in ek-sistence consists in ‘Being the there’. Dasein must be understood 
not adverbially and locally (Being there), but verbally, actively and transitively: 
Being the there. Hence, Dasein is definitely not the name of a substance, but the 
sentence of an action. ‘Being there’ in fact presupposes the dual prior given of a 
being and a place. But "Being the there" implies that Being properly ek-sists as its 
‘clearing’ (229). By this ‘clearing’ one must understand not in the first instance 
an illumination or a revelation which comes and brings Being to light— but Be-
ing itself as an opening, a spacing-out for possibilities of bringing to light46. 
This final remark about Being as opening, instead of revelation, makes clear 
the shift from Heidegger’s conception of the “originary ethics”. Indeed, 
Heidegger put the response to the invocation of Being at the forefront. By this 
he meant the dwelling in the proximity of Being, whose openness had to be 
corresponded by Dasein. In Nancy’s formulation, the openness is completely 
internal to Dasein as the entity that has the capacity of being different from it-
self- of differentiating itself. The Lichtung (“clearing”) is not the space of a 
dwelling that conduces to a revelation of something external to Dasein, but is 
the internal space of Dasein as openness to the other.  
This sort of reversal of the themes of the Letter of Humanism makes clear 
how for Nancy, as well as for Derrida, the formulation of an ethics of ontology 
 
45Ibid., p. 20. 
46Ibid., p. 21. 




is strictly connected to the “alteration” of the subject in its pre-empirical struc-
tures, an original Mitsein which arises in the individual consciousness and 
then transfers itself in the a posteriori relationships with other finite human 
beings. As noted, both Derrida and Nancy detect this structure of openness of 
subjectivity in some passages of Heidegger’s early philosophy, especially that of 
Being and Time and of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. This reference 
is explicitly formulated by Nancy, whereas in Derrida it emerges in a more in-
direct way through the criticisms of Levinas’s radical separation between ethics 
and ontology. But for Derrida, as well as for Nancy, the ethics of ontology as-
sumes a sense which differs from the one Heidegger formulates in the Letter of 
Humanism. There is no Being to which Dasein should answer, dwell close to, 
but there is just the injunction of being, of inscribing in the praxis the original 
difference that inhabits the subject. 
The reference to Nancy can then make clearer even the sense in which Der-
rida’s reading of Levinas’s writings preserve a basic continuity in all three of its 
moments. Indeed, the ethics of Being, the mutual implication of ethics and on-
tology, is not confined only to Violence and Metaphysics,nor does the re-
evaluation of Levinas’s ethics prove to be inconsistent with Derrida’s path that 
starts from his criticism of Husserl’s consciousness-ism, which in the end ren-
ders his ethics of ontology “heideggerian” in the specific and particular sense 
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